Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.
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Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations
The system can’t perform the operation now. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Articles 1—20 Show more. New citations to this author.
Does fertility respond to financial incentives? Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Search for items with the same title. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics.
salxnie Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. My profile My library Metrics Alerts. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries.
Professor of Economics, Columbia University. D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard.
The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
Journal of Political Economy 3, Estimating preferences under risk: Contradts address for updates. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam.
Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: Verified email at columbia. Here is how to contribute. New articles related to this author’s research.
Asymmetric information in insurance: For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.
The following articles are merged in Scholar. Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar. Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: The Economics of Contracts: Get my own profile Cited rconomics View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 This popular text, revised and updated throughout bernarx the second edition, serves as a ealanie and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists.
The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: New articles by this author.
Articles Cited by Co-authors. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Journal of the Econometric Society, Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: Is your work missing from RePEc? The economics of contracts: Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu.